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Abstract: In qualitative and action research, through Socratic dialogue, the 
researcher can help participants past a cognitive approach to the phenomenon, 
into a community of wonder (thaumazein), past observation of lived experience 
to foreboding and finally to openness. This openness serves as a ground for truth 
(aletheia). Researchers who try the Socratic approach may find it rewarding in 
the journey and in the research produced. 
Keywords: Socratic, Dialogue, Hermeneutic, Phenomenology, Qualitative 
Research, Action Research. 
 
Resumen: En la investigación-acción de carácter cualitativo el investigador 
puede, por medio del diálogo socrático, ayudar a los participantes a transitar 
desde un acercamiento cognitivo a uno fenomenológico si se ubican en el seno 
de una comunidad de admiración (thaumazein), desde  observación de las 
experiencias de vida a la intuición y al estado de apertura. Esta apertura es la 
base de la verdad (aletheia). Los investigadores que usen el enfoque socrático 
encontrarán recompensas tanto en su trabajo como en los resultados de sus 
indagaciones.  
Palabras clave: diálogo socrático, hermenéutica, fenomenología, investigación 
cualitativa, investigación-acción. 
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Introduction 
 
While qualitative and action research will always vary somewhat in 
goals, methods, and outcomes, in both kinds of research dialogue 
between the researcher and participant can be a key part of the 
research process. Through dialogue, both the researcher and the 
participants – or co-inquirers – can come together in wonder, 
opening themselves up to better allow the phenomena under study 
to reveal themselves. Following up on earlier works on Socratic 
dialogue in philosophical practice
1
, and after years of working with 
                                                          
1
 DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: "Shared Inquiry: Socratic-Hermeneutic Interpre-
viewing", in: IRONSIDE, Pamela (ed.): Beyond Method: Philosophical 
Conversations in Healthcare and Scholarship, University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 2005, pp. 111-147; DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, 
Jeanne: Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation 
Journeys, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014; SORRELL, Jeanne, 
CANGELOSI, Pamela and DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: "Dialog on a Country 
Path: The Qualitative Research Journey", in Nurse Education Today, vol. 34, 
Philadelphia, PA (USA), 2014, pp. 295-298; HANSEN, HANSEN;Finn 
Thorbjørn: Den sokratiske dialoggruppe [The Socratic Dialogue Group], 
Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2000; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Det filosofiske liv 
[The Philosophical Life], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2002; HANSEN, Finn 
Thorbjørn: At stå i det åbne: Dannelse gennem filosofisk undren og nærvær [To 
Stand in the Openness: Bildung through Philosophical Wonder and Presence], 
Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, 2008; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "One Step 
Further: The Dance Between Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in 
Phenomenological Research", in GALVIN, Kathleen (ed.): Indo-Pacific Journal 
of Phenomenology (Special Edition), New York, 2012, pp. 1-20; HANSEN, Finn 
Thorbjørn: Kan man undre sig uden ord?: Design- og universitetspædagogogik 
på kreative videregående uddannelser [Can We Wonder without Words? Design 
and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education], Aalborg University 
Press, Aalborg,  2014; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "Det sokratiske 
forskningsinterview [The Socratic Research Interview]", in MUNK, Karen (ed.): 
Metodefetichisme, kvalitative metode på afveje - ophav, kritik, nye perspektiver, 
Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 2015; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The Call 
and Practice of Wonder: How to Evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in 
Professional Settings", in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic 
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Socratic dialogue in the contexts of qualitative and action research, 
the authors have observed a consistent pattern of unfolding and 
opening in these dialogues. Through Socratic dialogue, the 
researcher helps participants through and past a cognitive approach 
to the phenomenon, leading to a point of being stuck or puzzled 
(aporia). Faced with aporia and encouraged to continue reflecting, 
the participant and the researcher enter together into a community 
of wonder (thaumazein), moving past mere observation and 
perception of lived experience to a sense of foreboding (“What is 
the phenomenon? Why is it hard to grasp? What in the 
phenomenon seems to call to me?”) and finally to openness. This 
openness is the comportment necessary for what Heidegger calls 
the “clearing” or “event”2. This openness allows the researcher and 
participant to serve as a ground for aletheia, allowing the 
phenomenon to reveal itself. While the authors’ earlier works have 
focused on aspects of aporia and thaumazein, this article will focus 
especially on the movement from wonder to foreboding to the open 
comportment necessary for aletheia.  
 
 
Socrates’ Goals and Method in Plato’s Works 
 
Since phenomenological researchers have a variety of established 
modes of questioning available to them, let us first examine the 
benefits specifically of Socratic dialogue, or Socratic shared 
inquiry. Heidegger asserts that in the search for truth, “the wonder 
                                                                                                                                   
Handbook, LIT Verlag, Vienna, 2015; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The 
Philosophical Practitioner as a Co-Researcher", in AMIR, Lydia and FATIC, 
Aleksandar (eds.): Practicing Philosophy, Cambridge Scholars Press, Cambridge, 
2015. 
2
 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper & Row Publishers, 
New York, 1975; HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the 
Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012. 
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of questioning must be experienced in carrying it out and must be 
made effective as an awakening and strengthening of the power to 
question.”3 Likewise Gadamer, in discussing phenomenological 
hermeneutic methods, argues, “only the person who knows how to 
ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which involves 
being able to preserve his orientation toward openness. The art of 
questioning is the art of questioning ever further.”4 Here, 
Gadamer’s language points to an advantage in a questioning style 
that allows for follow-up questions, for digging deeper into an 
inquiry, moving the inquiry toward openness. Gadamer goes on to 
say, “the hermeneutic phenomenon… implies the primacy of 
dialogue.”5 Dialogue, unlike some sorts of questioning, implies a 
back-and-forth, a give-and-take. For a conversation or an interview 
to be a dialogue, the researcher must listen, respond, project an idea 
forward, listen, and continue this way in a reciprocal process. The 
Socratic researcher must listen for concepts or ideas that seem to 
resonate with a “living meaning” as opposed to “the dead trace of 
meaning.”6 The researcher can be helped in these goals by having a 
sort of phenomenological “musicality”7 for the voice of the subject 
matter itself (die Sache selbst).   
 If such dialogue is the goal, the ancient expert of philosophical 
dialogue, Socrates, can still be very relevant for researchers today. 
Socrates as he appears in Plato’s dialogues is not just a model 
philosopher but a model philosophical practitioner. Unlike his 
                                                          
3
 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 10 
4
 GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 
1989, p. 367 
5
 Ibid, p. 369 
6
 Ibid, pp. 167 and 164 
7
 HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “One Step Further: The Dance Between Poetic 
Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in Phenomenological Research”, in GALVIN, 
Kathleen (ed.): Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (Special Edition), New 
York, 2012, pp. 1-20. 
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predecessors and the majority of philosophers who came after him, 
Socrates was no theoretician or arm-chair philosopher, and he did 
not merely apply his philosophical theories to larger issues. He 
insisted on practicing his philosophy as a communal activity.
8
 In 
Plato’s Apology, when Socrates is on trial for corrupting the youth, 
given the option of accepting exile as his sentence, he refuses, 
saying it would do him no good since then he would be among 
strangers who would not talk with him, so he would be unable to 
practice philosophy.
9
 
  Throughout Plato’s dialogues, we see Socrates pursuing 
philosophical inquiry through friendly, caring conversations with 
partners or a group. In fact, it is reasonably clear that Socrates was 
put to death not primarily for his views or for any sacrilege, but 
because he would not stop engaging in inquiry with the youth and 
encouraging them to pursue their own questions. Fortunately for 
modern researchers, Plato’s dialogues provide rich illustrations of 
Socrates’ mode of inquiry. While this method is not entirely 
consistent across all the dialogues, certain techniques and 
principles appear again and again, and these techniques and 
principles can serve as guides for modern researchers. 
 Socrates tends to start an inquiry by asking for a definition. In 
the Meno, when Meno abruptly asks Socrates whether or not virtue 
is teachable, Socrates insists, “I am so far from knowing whether 
virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have knowledge of 
what virtue itself is.”10 In other dialogues, when a friend or person 
of importance seems to be taking a significant action, Socrates 
begins an inquiry by asking the person to define the virtue relevant 
                                                          
8
 PLATO: Apology, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 29d 
9
 Ibid, pp. 37c-38a 
10
 PLATO: Meno, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 71a 
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to the situation.
11
 Starting with a definition allows both partners in 
the dialogue to have a foundation to examine, reflect on, and 
question as they explore their own ideas about the phenomenon 
under study. 
 To help an inquiry along, Socrates often uses an analogy to 
help his co-inquirer think through their own ideas and statements. 
When Euthyphro defines piety as a matter of service to the gods, 
Socrates asks about shipbuilders and generals to clarify what sort of 
service Euthyphro means.
12
 In a similar way, Socrates uses 
examples to test out and explore a co-inquirer’s statements. When 
Menexenus has claimed that two people can be friends when only 
one of them loves the other, Socrates presents a test example of a 
man who is hated by his beloved. Reflecting on this example, 
Menexenus finds that he wants to question his earlier claim, 
realizing now that neither person in such a case can be called a 
friend.
13
 
 A typical Socratic dialogue proceeds somewhat along the 
following pattern: 
1. A friend asks Socrates a question or Socrates sees someone 
performing a significant or questionable act. 
2. Socrates asks the person for a definition of the relevant 
virtue, thus beginning with his dialogue partner a shared 
inquiry into the nature of that virtue. 
3. The co-inquirer offers a definition. 
4. Using analogies, examples, and follow-up questions, 
Socrates prods the co-inquirer to help the co-inquirer find 
                                                          
11
 E.g., PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): 
Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 4c-d 
12
 PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, pp. 13e-14a 
13
 PLATO: Lysis, in REEVE, C.D.C (ed.): Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, 
Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selections from Republic and Laws, Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 2006, p. 212b-c 
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conflicts in his beliefs or other revelations that make him 
doubt his definition. 
5. The process of #4 leads the co-inquirer to revise or reject 
his definition of the virtue. 
6. Socrates encourages the co-inquirer to try another 
definition. Steps 3-5 repeat. 
7. The dialogue ends, usually with little resolution. A proper 
definition has not been found, and Socrates and his co-
inquirer are left to ponder further. 
 Underlying these techniques and patterns, and just as important 
to his method, are certain principles Socrates seems to hold dear. 
He considers the inquiry to be a shared inquiry. While he maintains 
a Socratic veil and rarely shares his own opinion outright, he does 
participate actively in the dialogue, allowing his own expectations 
to guide his questioning as he and his partner explore the partner’s 
beliefs about the phenomenon. Socrates sees this inquiry as a 
process that guides his partners to “discover within themselves a 
multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the 
light.”14 
 Socrates frequently and explicitly insists that his co-inquirers 
say what they actually believe, rather than saying the popular view 
or what they have heard from experts or what they think Socrates 
wants them to say. Socrates asks Crito, “try to answer what I ask 
you in the way you think best.”15 Theaetetus raises this issue 
explicitly when he says, “if I answer what seems true in relation to 
the present question, I shall say ‘no, it is not possible;’ but if I 
consider it in relation to the question that went before, then in order 
to avoid contradicting myself, I say ‘Yes, it is.’” Socrates asserts 
that Theaetetus must say what he believes, not just what will allow 
                                                          
14
 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 1990, p. 150d 
15
 PLATO: Crito, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 49a 
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him to avoid contradiction: “if you answer ‘Yes,’… the tongue will 
be safe from refutation but the mind will not.”16 
 Socrates says that he is a midwife like his mother, except that 
he is a midwife of ideas. Midwives in Ancient Greece helped 
deliver babies and also were trusted match-makers. For Socrates, 
this midwife role involves helping his co-inquirer connect (match 
up) beliefs and ideas, looking to see which ones yield “phantoms” 
or “fertile truths.”17 Socrates seems to rely on a connectedness 
among his partner’s beliefs and an instinct from the partner of 
which ideas are closer to the truth. Thus, if Socrates can identify a 
conflict between beliefs, he can press his co-inquirer to choose one 
over the other – which seems more right? The most dramatic 
example of this cross-comparison happens when Euthyphro 
describes care of the gods as giving them what they need. Socrates 
asks, do we care for the gods in a way that is supposed to make 
them better? Euthyphro, a good priest, responds “by Zeus, no!”18 
 Socrates explains this connecting-and-comparing process in the 
Theaetetus: “Our first aim will be to look at our thoughts 
themselves in relation to themselves, and see what they are – 
whether, in our opinion, they agree with one another or are entirely 
at variance.”19 In that same work, Socrates asserts that midwives 
are “marvelously knowing about the kind of couples whose 
marriage will produce the best children.”20 He seems here to 
suggest that he is an expert in helping his dialogue partners find 
which ideas to compare to think more deeply and reflect more 
                                                          
16
 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 1990, p. 154d 
17
 Ibid, p. 150c 
18
 PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 13c 
19
 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 1990, p. 154e 
20
 Ibid, p. 149d 
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critically on their beliefs about a given phenomenon. This process 
has no set goal, no assumed outcome, beyond a search for, and love 
of, wisdom and truth. And with that love of wisdom comes “doric 
harmony: between logos and ergon.
21
 As Socrates describes this 
beautiful process, “the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved 
wherever it may lead him.”22 
 Together, Socrates and his co-inquirer can check each other’s 
assumptions and help each other follow genuinely “the beloved” 
(the call of the inquiry or the phenomenon itself). The process may 
be largely negative – discovering false assumptions, realizing that 
perceived aspects of the phenomenon might not be accurate – right 
up to the end of a dialogue, when almost always the dialogue 
partner expresses frustration at not having found a definition. The 
partner, and the dialogue as a whole, are left in aporia. They are 
stuck, struck dumb by realization of how little they know that they 
thought they knew. But throughout the dialogues, it is abundantly 
clear that this aporia is a positive force. The aporia gets 
interlocutors past the illusion that they know what they do not 
know. After all, Socrates is the wisest man in Greece not because 
he knows so much, but because more than anyone else, he knows 
how little he knows.
23
 
 For some interlocutors, aporia may be where their inquiry 
ends. Frustrated, they know they do not know, but cannot or will 
not proceed past that point. For others – those who love wisdom, 
those who seek truth – aporia creates a sense of wonder, or 
thaumazein. Famously, in the Theaetetus, Socrates says, “For this 
is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this 
                                                          
21
 PLATO: Laches, in SPRAGUE, Rosamond Kent (trans.): Laches and 
Charmides, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 188d 
22
 PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 14b 
23
 PLATO: Apology, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 23b 
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wondering (thaumazein): this is where philosophy begins and 
nowhere else.”24 This oft-quoted sentence has led many scholars to 
attribute to Plato (or to Plato’s Socrates) the claim that philosophy 
begins in wonder. But Plato gives us very little to go on here. What 
is this wonder? Why must philosophy begin in thaumazein? 
Ranner
25
 argues that thaumazein is a philosopher’s response to 
aporia. The choice and determination to continue dwelling in the 
realization of lack of knowledge, to continue the inquiry – this 
determination is thaumazein; this commitment is the beginning of 
philosophy. The beginning of philosophy in its original sense as 
“love of wisdom,” not a theoretical, merely intellectual approach, 
but a true longing and desire. Heidegger writes about this passage, 
emphasizing the importance continually to dwell in wonder: 
 
This characterization of the origin of philosophy out of marveling… is 
often quoted and readily cited in order to account for the origin of 
philosophy psychologically and in that way to deprive philosophy 
precisely of the wondrous… But what is at issue here is only to raise 
philosophy – or any other essentially creative power – up into its 
inexplicability and to preserve it there, and only there, as a possible 
acquisition against all trivialization. To say philosophy originates in 
wonder means philosophy is wondrous in its essence and becomes more 
wondrous the more it becomes what it really is.
26
 
 
This reading of thaumazein and its place in inquiry and in 
philosophy fits well with the Cave allegory. This thaumazein is a 
sort of love (eros) of wisdom, a love experienced as wonder. We 
                                                          
24
 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 1990, p. 155d 
25
 RANNER, Oliver: “Plato and Aristotle on the Origin of Philosophy”, available 
in http://www.apaclassics.org/AnnualMeeting/03mtg/abstracts/ranner.html (last 
access September 30, 2015), 2003. 
26
 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” 
of “Logic”, ROJCEWICZA, Richard and SCHUWER, Andre (trans.), Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 1994, p. 141 
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experience true wonderment when we silently experience an 
ontological relation with something we really care for but that we 
cannot find words for or explain. The prisoner shackled all his life 
in the cave, who escapes to see the real world and eventually the 
sun, faces pain, hardship, fear, confusion, and is eventually 
rewarded with the light of truth. His experience is dazzling, 
blinding and at the same time wondrous and beautiful. Quite an 
egalitarian for his time, Socrates – who taught youth who could not 
afford to pay Sophists, and taught a slave boy to do geometry
27
 – 
says after the Cave allegory, “our present discussion… shows that 
the power to learn is present in everyone’s soul and that the 
instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be 
turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole 
body.”28 This strong assertion by Socrates, together with the 
dialogue model Plato entrusts to us in his works, gives today’s 
researchers a guiding path and also a promise. In a shared inquiry, 
each soul – researcher’s and participant’s – can be turned toward 
the light. This light is not a cognitive truth but rather a living 
ontological relation and sudden opening that happens so that 
wordless insight (nous) can happen.  
 With the cave as a key illustration of the Socratic journey 
(following the “beloved”), and thaumazein understood in this light, 
it becomes clear that Socrates’ questions in the dialogues are not 
seeking to expose mere logical deficiencies in interlocutors’ 
statements. His questions seek what phenomenologists might call 
an existential or ontological deficiency. If a person cannot live his 
thoughts, or if his thoughts are out of harmony with each other, he 
is not out of the cave; he is not in the loving relation with the 
world. Socrates’ dialogues aim to strengthen the interlocutor’s 
                                                          
27
 PLATO: Meno, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five 
Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 82b-84b 
28
 PLATO: Republic, GRUBE, G.M.A and REEVE, C.D.C. (trans), Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 1992, p. 518c 
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ergon by way of studying and testing the logos. Gadamer writes in 
Dialogue and Dialectic:
29
 “When we have been disappointed by 
another and must say of him that ‘he has no idea of what friendship 
is’, we are speaking of no logical deficiency in his ability to define 
something, to be sure, but of a deficiency in knowledge 
nonetheless.” Thus, if we want truly to know what friendship is 
(ontologically) we must first live it, be-with and be-in-relation-to 
the phenomenon. The prisoner comes out of the cave into the light 
to live The Good and The Beautiful, to hunt for the words (logoi) 
while seeking to ground his deed (ergon) in truth (aletheia). To 
seek Doric harmony in life and actions. 
 
 
Goals and Outcomes of Socratic Dialogue in Qualitative and 
Action Research  
 
The goal of Socratic dialogue in Plato’s works seems to be initially 
aporia, opening the way for thaumazein and, ideally, eventually, 
aletheia - truth. The goal of Socratic dialogue in qualitative or 
action research is largely the same, but with more emphasis on the 
search for and proper comportment to ground truth as aletheia. 
Aletheia is not a propositional truth or a clear concept description. 
Rather, it is the truth of the Ancient Greeks who came before Plato, 
the truth before humans began to think of truth as correctness. 
Aletheia is a self-revealing of the phenomenon that is the subject of 
the inquiry. The phenomenon unconceals itself.
30
  
 In seeking aletheia, Socratic dialogue in research seeks that 
openness that makes way for aletheia: An openness that comes 
                                                          
29
 GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical 
Studies on Plato, SMITH, P. Christopher (trans.), Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1980, p. 10 
30
 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Being and Time, STAMBAUGH, Joan (trans.), SUNY 
Press, New York, 2010. 
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with love (of inquiry, of wisdom), with care (for the phenomenon, 
for those encountered with it) and with a desire to live an examined 
life. This research is grounded in Socrates’ claim that “an 
unexamined life is not worth living”,31 a commitment to help 
participants dwell in wonder rather than give up in aporia, to 
describe authentically lived experience and then move beyond to a 
reflective view of that experience and of that perspective. In that 
moving beyond lived experience, the participant and researcher 
may experience a foreboding – a sense of the phenomenon, of truth 
itself, concealing itself even as unconcealment is on the horizon. 
This foreboding is the final preparation for the openness that 
grounds aletheia.  
 Many elements of Socratic inquiry are synergistic with 
elements of phenomenological theory and practice. Eidetic 
reduction, for example, tends to involve comparisons, the 
imagining of differences, and a testing of what belongs to the 
phenomenon and what does not. Van Manen describes eidetic 
reduction in this way: 
 
Eidetic reduction aims to somehow express in language what is 
experienced prior to reflection on the experience… In eidedic reduction 
one needs to see past or through the particularity of lived experience 
toward the eidos that lies on the other side of the concreteness of lived 
meaning. The idea of phenomenological eidos does not refer to some 
immutable universal or generalization about human nature of human 
life… The first important reminder is that phenomenological inquiry is 
only concerned with "possible" human experiences - not with 
experiences that are presumed to be empirically or culturally universal 
or shared by all human irrespective of time, culture, gender, or other 
circumstances. The second important reminder is that 
phenomenological determination of meaning is always indeterminate, 
always tentative, always incomplete, always inclined to question 
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assumptions by returning again and again to lived experience itself, the 
beginning of phenomenological inquiry.
 32
 
 
Along similar lines, Socratic inquiry is designed to compare, test 
assumptions, and ferret out the borders of a phenomenon. In 
addition to eidetic reduction, the hermeneutic circle is echoed in 
Socrates’ inquiries, which often circle back to the beginning. 
Heidegger states that on the hermeneutic circle, “every inquiry is a 
seeking,” and that “every seeking gets guided before-hand by what 
is sought.”33 Socratic method relies on Socrates’ (or the 
researcher’s) glimpses of what may lie just ahead in the inquiry to 
guide the questions asked of the partner or research participant. 
These glimpses are not just possible logical steps ahead but rather 
possible inspirations and forebodings from the “reverberation” of 
the phenomenon being invited into the inquiry.  
 Similarly, Socrates’ model as a midwife suits the modern 
phenomenological researcher well. Socrates’ inquiries are rooted in 
care – for the phenomenon as such, for his dialogue partners, for 
his community – just as a modern researcher’s inquiry is or should 
be. In research through Socratic dialogue, the researcher and 
participant develop a trust and a closeness. The researcher must 
show vulnerability and expose some of her own assumptions to 
questioning, just as Socrates does. This finds its zenith in the 
community of wonder where both the Socratic researcher and the 
interlocutor(s) are taken and led by the questions and by the subject 
matter itself. Like Socrates, like a midwife, the researcher leads the 
participant to a way of self-care – an examined life; an authentic, 
reflective, philosophical life. By leading participants past aporia, 
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encouraging them to dwell in wonder, to welcome the foreboding 
of the phenomenon as truth withdraws and then is revealed, the 
researcher can hope to help participants develop tools or cultivate 
virtues to keep thinking and reflecting beyond the limited situation 
of the interview or of the group research sessions. The researcher 
can guide participants to continue to see the sun even when they 
must journey back into the everyday life of the cave – whether that 
be taking care of a loved one with Alzheimer’s or living one’s daily 
professional practice.  
 In practice, Socratic dialogue in research follows the same 
principles and techniques as Socrates in Plato’s dialogues. The 
researcher may start by asking for a definition or asks some other 
foundational question. In trying to answer the initial question, the 
participant is likely to hit obstacles and to discover conflicts in 
beliefs as the researcher asks about examples or offers analogies. 
Through this process, the participant’s naturally cognitive approach 
to the phenomenon is accepted and even welcomed but eventually 
defeated. Any phenomenon under study resists clear, simple, 
objective description; the phenomenon conceals itself. Once the 
cognitive approach proves a challenge and ends in aporia, once the 
participants have rich awareness of their not-knowing about the 
phenomenon, the participants are ready for wonder, thaumazein, 
for openness to the mystery.
34
 With the cognitive approach closed 
down, researcher and participant can stop thinking at the 
phenomenon and begin to dwell in that uncomfortable but 
intriguing space of ignorance and longing-to-know, the place where 
a certain “hearken” and foreboding starts to appear. They can 
pursue wisdom together, excitedly chasing after the call of the 
phenomenon. In their community of wonder, they can practice 
love-of-wisdom, philosophy, together. This process is akin to what 
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Heidegger calls “the critical regress from correctness to 
openness.”35 
 Having moved beyond the merely cognitive, this wonder and 
awareness of mystery allow participants to focus on their lived 
experience of and with the phenomenon. How has it actually 
appeared and been experienced, beyond what we think it is 
supposed to be? This phase of the qualitative interview, or of the 
“Wonder Lab” in the action research process, asks participants to 
relate to the phenomenon in an experiential, existential, even 
ontological way. What is it to be-with the phenomenon? To be-in-
the-world in relation to the phenomenon? Participants are helped to 
articulate what they have witnessed and experienced, with many of 
their presuppositions and opinions now cleared away. In focusing 
on their lived experience, they come closer to their immediate 
connection with the phenomenon. 
 While lived experience is the focus or even the goal of much 
qualitative research in current practice, lived experience alone 
raises concerns about what it does or does not reveal about the 
phenomenon. Brinkmann
36
 argues that limited questioning 
designed to elicit descriptions of lived experience lets the 
researcher learn more about the participant than about the 
phenomenon; he calls these interviews “doxastic,” stating that they 
reveal primarily the participants’ impressions or opinions about the 
phenomenon
37
. Van Manen
38
 also discusses the limitations of a 
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focus on lived experience. Experience, he says, is immediate and 
elusive; complex enough that it is difficult for any description to 
capture its essence. 
 Heidegger also explores the limitations of lived experience. In 
The Origin of the Work of Art, his concerns about experience of art 
can alert us to concerns about focus on experience overall. He 
argues, “The way in which man experiences art is supposed to give 
information about its nature. Experience is the source that is 
standard … for art appreciation…Everything is an experience. Yet 
perhaps experience is the element in which art dies.”39 Heidegger is 
concerned that by focusing on experience, we Enframe the work of 
art, filtering and predetermining how it should appear to us. We 
force it to appear before us, to appear for us. Generalizing from 
Heidegger’s concerns here about understanding art merely through 
experience, we can see that focus on lived experience leads 
participants to ask, “what does the phenomenon mean to me? How 
does it appear to me?” Focus on lived experience is a very useful 
step in grasping our direct connections with the phenomenon and 
beginning to articulate our experiences of the phenomenon. 
Limiting ourselves to lived experience, however, does an injustice 
to the phenomenon and fails to lay the groundwork for the process 
of aletheia.  
 Heidegger voices similar concerns about lived experience in 
Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event). In that work, he finds 
that “lived experience promotes and entrenches the anthropological 
                                                                                                                                   
interviewing that goes from doxa over episteme to thaumazein as it is in fact not 
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way of thinking.”40 He sees the focus on lived experience as linked 
to machination and our obsessive need to explain (and thereby 
control) everything, while beyng and truth abandon us.
41
 Heidegger 
thus urges us to reach beyond this anthropocentric view to that 
which withdraws from us. To put this same idea in Socratic terms, 
the concern seems to be that even in focusing on lived experience, 
there is still an illusion of knowing, a blocking out of the not-
knowing, of the phenomenon and truth that withdraw from us even 
as we try to grasp them. Of course, in any phenomenological 
inquiry, we are always examining the phenomenon through 
experience, because experience is all we have; experience is reality.  
 Nevertheless, addressing the concerns voiced above, we do not 
have to put ourselves at the center of that experiential truth. A 
philosophical practitioner can help a research participant move to a 
more reflective critical mode, looking from outside at this lived 
experience. The practitioner first can encourage the participants to 
‘unfreeze’ the frozen concepts, assumptions, or intuitions which the 
participant has used to describe this lived experience or which seem 
to be taken for granted in the description. Next this Socratic 
practitioner can join the participants in trying to think from within 
or towards that which seems to emerge when the frozen concepts 
are opened up and the phenomenon becomes more free to ‘speak 
back’ in its own voice. To get into a resonance or dialogue with 
that ‘voice’, the researcher and participants in the dialogue have to 
move into a more contemplative, wondrous and listening kind of 
attuned thinking (which the Greeks called the movement of 
theoria). This critical reflection and wondrous thinking may 
parallel the journey out of Plato’s cave, a journey researcher and 
participant make together.  
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 Awareness of the limits of lived experience, as this seeming 
knowing is revealed to be a new stage of not-knowing, can help 
bring on an uneasiness, a restlessness or anxiety, like what 
Heidegger calls the foreboding: “In the first beginning: wonder. In 
the other beginning: foreboding.”42 Many if not all researchers have 
experienced this foreboding, even if they have not labelled it in this 
way. It can be that spine-tingling or eerie sense that something 
beyond us speaks to us even as it withdraws. Heidegger says it is 
the “basic disposition” needed for aletheia; a disposition without 
which “everything is a forced clatter of concepts and of the mere 
shells of words.”43 Heidegger says the term “foreboding” will not 
always capture this disposition, which might also be called “shock” 
or “restraint.” In whatever form it takes, it is the “sheltering of the 
unconcealment of the concealed”,44 i.e. it is the ground for aletheia. 
 In Socratic interviewing and the action-in-the-field done by the 
‘Wonder Lab’ of Socratic action research (see later), as the 
researcher guides participants past the cognitive and any “clatter of 
concepts” or “mere shells of words” to aporia to a state of wonder 
and then a realization of the limitations of lived experience, the 
Socratic questioning provides a consistent reminder of the not-
knowing. It brings on the vulnerability experienced in foreboding 
in order to make way for aletheia. Returning to the interpretation of 
Plato’s thaumazein as a philosopher’s response to aporia, Socratic 
questioning maintains the acceptance – even the embrace - of the 
not-knowing. It preserves the choice to inquire, to listen, to wonder, 
rather than to admit defeat or to declare a question decided. 
Heidegger calls for this same sort of attitude when he declares, 
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“The questioners have broken the habit of curiosity; their seeking 
loves the abyss, in which they know the oldest ground.”45  
 Socratic questioning thus prepares the way for aletheia by 
establishing and preserving the proper comportment for the 
grounding of aletheia. Truth as aletheia is an event, a clearing. This 
clearing, Heidegger says, is the clearing “for concealment (truth as 
un-truth), in itself conflictual.” Truth, he says, is “the clearing for 
self-concealing.”46 On this understanding of truth, one cannot have 
truth (unconcealment) without concealment. Socratic inquiry’s 
preservation of the not-knowing acts as a concealment – a shutting 
down of assumptions and of demands projected at the phenomenon, 
with a resulting protecting concealment to allow for the 
phenomenon’s unconcealment. Heidegger makes the importance of 
this knowing-we-do-not-know clear in his insistence that the 
clearing, the potential unfolding of aletheia, must not become “an 
emptiness in which everything simply presents itself as equally 
easy to ‘understand’ and master.”47 
 Socratic questioning, among all forms of dialogue, has perhaps 
the unique ability to maintain concealment – this awareness of not-
knowing – while preparing the ground for unconcealment. 
Heidegger argues: 
 
The self-concealing protrudes through the clearing, and only if that 
happens, i.e. only if the conflictual in its intimacy reigns throughout the 
‘there,’ can the dislodgement from the indeterminate (and, as such, not 
at all grasped) domain of representation and lived experience succeed 
and can steadfastness in Da-sein be attempted… Therefore truth is 
never merely clearing; it essentially occurs as concealment just as 
originarily and intimately along with the clearing. These, clearing and 
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concealment, are not two; instead they constitute the essential 
occurrence of the one truth itself.
48
 
 
Thus, Socratic dialogue’s reciprocal relationship between not-
knowing and the love of wisdom and inquiry, between thaumazein 
and aletheia, may suit it perfectly for preserving and following this 
conflictual yet necessary relationship between concealment and 
unconcealment.  
 The Socratic researcher’s goal to help participants live 
philosophically, to live an examined life, also fits well with what 
Heidegger views as the authentic life for Da-sein. He worries that 
we have lost the ability to be Da-sein as we fall prey to belief in 
our own knowledge and the control and power over the world that 
come with that knowledge. He urges that we must “let Da-sein 
arise out of … the essential occurrence of truth in order to ground 
therein beings as a whole and as such and, in the midst of them, to 
ground the human being.”49 Our calling, Heidegger believes, our 
role as Da-sein if we are to live authentically, happens only “in the 
modes in which truth is sheltered out of the securing of the cleared-
concealed event.”50  
 Thus, to pursue Socratic inquiry, to remain in wonder with a 
preservation of the not-knowing, is to live authentically, to live 
philosophically; to resist being curious for answers and instead 
remain open to being a ground for truth to reveal itself. When 
researcher and participant become, together, a ground for the 
clearing that is aletheia, the researcher is helping the participant to 
live authentically. There is a vulnerability in this process for both 
researcher and participant; they are allowing themselves to be 
thrown, unprotected, into the happening of the clearing.
51
 This 
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vulnerability requires the care, trust, and respect that Socrates so 
often models in Plato’s dialogues. 
 
 
Socratic Dialogue in Practice – Qualitative Research and 
Action Research  
 
A qualitative or action researcher who wishes to guide participants 
through this process from a cognitive to a more ontological 
approach to the phenomenon, seeking an openness as a grounding 
for aletheia, will be served well by a Socratic shared inquiry 
approach. Just as importantly, this approach enables the researcher 
herself to remain open, as the dialogue tests her own assumptions 
as well, avoiding what Gadamer calls “the tyranny of hidden 
prejudices that [make] us deaf to what speaks to us.”52 In addition 
to the benefits of the dialogue itself, beginning with a definitional 
question allows the researcher to start at a neutral point so that 
interview participants can take the conversation in their own 
direction. Participants are likely to introduce ideas the researcher 
may not have anticipated. 
 Following are specific examples from qualitative and action 
research to help give a more thorough picture of how this method 
unfolds in both of these contexts. In both qualitative one-on-one 
interviews and in action research in a group practice setting, it is 
best to explain to participants a bit about the method, so that 
participants will not be caught off guard by the questioning, nor 
mistake it as meant to challenge in an unfriendly way. The 
researcher might say, “I may press you a bit, and that is so we can 
both work to understand the implications of what you are saying.” 
The researcher should make explicit that this is a shared inquiry: “I 
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don’t know the answers either – I want to learn from you,” an echo 
of what Socrates tells his dialogue partners in almost every Platonic 
dialogue. 
53
 
 A researcher using Socratic dialogue makes herself more 
vulnerable than one who is using a more structured approach to 
interviewing, for instance one with largely pre-determined 
questions. She must be ready to expose her own doubts and 
prejudices and also to think on her feet. Because the dialogue can 
be challenging for the researcher and participants, it is all the more 
important for the researcher to model clearly the virtues of 
friendship, love, humility, patience, humor, and courage. The 
researcher thereby can invite the participants to practice these same 
virtues: the courage to put oneself at play, to take a stand; the 
patience to wait for the phenomenon’s call; the humility in 
accepting, without being too discouraged, our own lack of 
knowledge. 
 
Socratic one-on-one interviews in qualitative research 
 
In one-on-one interviews in qualitative research, after setting the 
stage and explaining the method, the researcher starts by asking for 
a definition of the phenomenon in question. Most likely, the 
participants have been chosen because of some significant 
connection with the phenomenon, so they will expect that they 
know a fair amount about it. In a recent study on women’s 
experiences writing a dissertation,
54
 the researcher started with the 
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question, “what is a dissertation?” Some participants tried 
definitions that were ultimately abandoned or heavily revised, 
while others were stuck from the very start, realizing they had 
written an entire dissertation but still could not say what one is.  
 When Eleanor was asked, “what is a dissertation?” she said: 
“When I started thinking about that question, I had trouble 
separating it from what I believe other people think it should be . . . 
and it’s kind of funny because one of the things I think a 
dissertation is means our making that separation, and figuring out 
what we really do believe.”55 Here, we see Eleanor catching herself 
tempted to violate the “say what you believe” principle. It is often 
easier to articulate what we know others say of the phenomenon – 
what it is supposed  to be – than what we think it is ourselves. 
Alecia found she could best express her definition of a dissertation 
through an analogy: 
 
The whole idea is very pregnancy-like, it’s very much your baby that 
you create, but… it’s totally you and I guess what people are able to do 
is to say, okay, this is my genes, and I want this, this, this, this, this, and 
this… having this huge project that looms ahead of you that you’ve 
spent all this time working in this area, developing this thing, you have 
some definite ideas about how this is, and then you’re creating this 
kinda baby of yours.
56
 
 
Many of the participants found that their understanding of a 
dissertation had changed as they had progressed in the writing 
process. Mary said, “When you start you think, oh, I’m going to 
answer an enormous question and make such a difference. But 
that’s just not true. You’re going to answer maybe a part of a 
question, or you’re going to add to the body of knowledge about a 
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question that others are working on. But that kept me up at night, 
you know?”57 In all of these interviews, the definition or the 
attempt at a definition is never a conclusive answer. Instead, the 
attempt at the definition opens up the participant’s thinking, 
exposing assumptions, forcing a comparison of beliefs with each 
other and with actual experience, opening up the inquiry for 
genuine curiosity and wonder. 
 Examples and analogies help a participant in one-on-one 
interviews explore and test their beliefs and statements about the 
phenomenon. In a research study on the value of a face-to-face 
liberal arts education,
58
 several students were asked the initial 
question, “What is X College to you?” The students explained that 
faculty and staff at their college “cared” about them as people, not 
just students. The concept of care can mean many things, and 
therefore examples and analogies were necessary to examine these 
statements further. How is this care the same or different as the 
care you would expect from a professional to a client, from a 
doctor to a patient? How is it the same or different from the care of 
a family member? One student explained that caring from faculty is 
unique: 
 
When you know that you are going to be asked to be engaged 
personally, there is an accountability there. It’s like the professor says, 
“I care about you and I'm invested in you” - holding me accountable - I 
have to perform to get the most out of that relationship, and in the 
freshman year, we might not do that, but when you finally do that, the 
rewards are out of this world. 
 
Another student responded, “it's more of a mentor/protégé sort of 
thing and that's been vitally important towards development of 
what I believe and my approach to my academics.” This response, 
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in turn, prompted questions about what mentor and protégé meant 
in this context. 
 When a college counselor in this study said that the culture on 
campus is like that of family, this claim necessitated prompting on 
the ways in which the culture is or is not like a family of mother, 
father, son, or daughter living in a household. This questioning 
allowed the counselor to clarify that part of the family aspect on the 
campus is the living together, the being there for each other: “most 
of our students might [when they are stressed] - if they were living 
at home or in a different place might go to a parent or a best friend 
or someone who had known them for a long time  - and they come 
here and they don't have that. They are looking for a safe place to 
be.” The counselor explained, “I think that we do a lot of times 
help cushion or take the place of that family unit that these students 
are leaving for the first time.” 
 In these one-on-one interviews, the researcher is always 
midwifing. She is connecting ideas, looking to see which ones 
might match up to lead to a fruitful step in the inquiry, even if that 
step is primarily a negative or purgatory one – bringing to light 
prejudices or gaps in knowledge. The interviews always reach a 
point of aporia in which both researcher and participant realize that 
what they do not know about the phenomenon far outweighs what 
they do know. In the dissertation study, this aporia was particularly 
powerful, as the women participants realized that after years of 
writing and eventually completing a dissertation, they still did not 
know what it was. This realization of not-knowing led to important 
dialogue about the lack of clarity in graduate programs about what 
a dissertation is or supposed to be, and eventually led to a link 
between this uncertainty and the frustrations and feelings of 
isolation the women had experienced.
59
 The researcher and each 
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participant thus moved from failed definitions, to aporia, to wonder 
and a richer description of the participants’ broader lived 
experiences. In reflecting on these lived experiences, both 
researcher and participant came upon an uneasiness, and in it a 
tantalizing call, to learn more of the truth of the phenomenon under 
study. 
 In these one-on-one qualitative research interviews, the 
researcher is the keeper of the hermeneutic circle, welcoming a 
deliberate and fruitful circularity. The researcher may ask the same 
questions more than once of the same participant, comparing 
different answers the participant gives. Or she might retrace a 
conversation back to its beginning to see what details might have 
been overlooked or omitted. The researcher may even notice that 
the participant’s own ideas from the beginning of an interview 
return later in the same interview; she then follows up on the 
implied connection that might warrant further investigation. The 
Socratic qualitative researcher follows the hermeneutic circle not 
just in this kind of circling back to earlier parts of an interview, but 
also in connecting one interview to the next. She allows what is 
learned in each interview to inform and influence her questions and 
responses in the interviews that follow. In this way, even though 
the participants do not have a chance to dialogue directly with each 
other, the researcher can serve as a connector of the separate shared 
inquiries, helping to make them part of a larger whole. 
 
Socratic dialogue groups and ‘wonder labs’ in action research 
 
There are of course many similarities between the Socratic 
dialogue form as it unfolds in a one-on-one interview in qualitative 
research and as it is played out in a Socratic dialogue group and 
wonder lab in an action research project. The processes and journey 
of first reflecting critically about a chosen concept or question and 
later to arrive at an epistemological puzzlement (aporia) and later 
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again to an ontological wonderment (thaumazein) and end in a kind 
of listening to the Call and truth-telling of the phenomenon 
(aletheia) in the lived experience – is the same journey in a 
Socratic action research approach. 
 The difference, however, might be seen in the following four 
aspects: 
1) When research is done in shared group sessions and inquires: In 
an action research project and process
60
 the action researcher is 
supposed to go into the field and participate on an equal level with 
the members of an organization or profession. Together the action 
researcher and pilot group of say 7 practitioners, decide on what 
kind of problem, possibility or wonderment they want to inquire 
into. The practitioners are seen as co-inquirers (not doing research 
on people but with people) in an even more radical way than 
qualitative researchers normally will describe their interactions and 
dialogues with the interviewees. Thus, doing action research is not 
so much as a qualitative researcher a question of going out to 
people in the professional field in order through interviews and 
observations to do an information gatherings and then later – safely 
back in the armchair – to reflect upon and analyze the ‘empirical 
data’. This is not the case of course in the above description of 
Socratic one-on-one interviews in qualitative research done by 
Dinkins. But you can still say that the Socratic one-on-one 
interview is a kind of serial process of many interviews with many 
different people, where the only remaining person is the qualitative 
researcher. She moves around like a bee collecting ‘philosophical 
nectar’ at each one-on-one interview and back at the office and in 
dialogue with the academic research environment she herself 
develops the final ‘honey’ – the research result. Of course there 
will also be moments of armchair reflecting and ‘academic honey-
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making’ as well in the action researcher’s work. But the Socratic 
action research is a more shared inquiry where the action researcher 
meets with the same group of people and main parts of the 
researching ‘happens-in-action’ and group sessions. And while 
always reflecting and being in groups the action researcher is also 
allowed more than ‘the serial qualitative researcher’, to have a 
better chance of following a dialogue and a thinking and a practice-
based research that really is more in the hand of the practitioners 
than in the researcher’s hand. The researcher thus can act as 
midwife, a ‘match-encourager’ of trying out life forms and ways of 
living in the participants’ own lives where different important 
philosophical ideas are lived out – and tried out in the living or by 
living it at the concrete place or in the organization over time. 
2) Time, lots of time, is the leisure of doing Socratic action 
research: The action researcher must allowed a huge amount of 
time that to stay out in the practice and culture of the practitioners, 
as well as time to facilitate different forms of Socratic dialogue 
groups or other wonder-based dialogue and reflection workshops 
with the participants. This extra time dimension seems paramount 
for the results of the Socratic action research.  
 Firstly it helps the Socratic action researcher to dwell in the 
unique life form and culture of the practitioners. Not in order – as 
the anthropologist – to spot and describe socio-cultural and socio-
material patterns and habits, but rather to experience more 
phenomenological, at least in a glimpse, what it is like to be in such 
practices. This may help the Socratic action researcher to ‘wonder-
from-within-practice’ at least in a better way than if the action 
researcher was only staying in the organization or professional 
community of practice for short visits. So in order to look for and 
critically question the ‘lived philosophy’ of the practice, that the 
practitioners seems to take for granted, it helps that the Socratic 
action researcher has also an embodied and lived experience of 
being in this place. But for sure, only the practitioner himself can 
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be a true insider of this place and practice. So the main purpose of 
the Socratic action researcher is – through dialogues and shared 
reflection-in-actions-with-the-practitioners – to act as a midwife for 
the lived philosophies and fundamental assumptions and values that 
is silently and often unnoticed taken for granted by the practitioners 
themselves.  
 Secondly it is also important to notice that to get people into an 
authentic and living wonderment in connection with the 
practitioners’ own lives, lived experiences and professional 
practices – time, lots of tranquil and continuous time, is needed. 
Experiences from doing Socratic action research on a Danish 
design school
61
 and a Danish hospice
62
 shows that the most 
important insights, openings and wonderments did not in fact 
emerge during the facilitated group sessions and workshop (the 
Wonder Labs) but happened between these meetings and 
gatherings. Typically these wonderments and invocative clearings 
would happen when the practitioner was driving home, walking by 
the beach, taking a shower, or other places where an insight or 
wonder suddenly and unexpectedly came as an inspiration. 
Typically a Socratic action project will be of minimum one year 
and normally 2-3 years. And this of course will also give the action 
researcher and his co-inquirers in the field many opportunities to 
try out things, do experiments alone by themselves or with the 
action researcher and to let a more slow Bildung process occur 
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where the Socratic virtues, mentioned above, can be learning and 
trained.  
3) Wonder Labs as the action-in-the-field: When doing action 
research the people engaged are also expected to do some sort of 
new action in the field or professional practice in order to initiate 
change in the organization or professional practice ‘for the better’. 
What ‘for the better’ means depend on what kind of tradition of 
action research we are working within. It is, though, important to 
know that normally action research is understood as a problem-
solving and pro-active and emancipatory performance, where there 
is a goal for change to come in the organization or profession. The 
Norwegian action researcher, Olav Eikeland
63
 would call such an 
action research for a practice-oriented and practice-based action 
research as opposed to praxis-oriented and praxis-based action 
research. Eikeland draws on the philosophy of Aristotle (especially 
The Nicomachean Ethics) and his notion of praxis as an activity 
that is a value in itself. Whereas practice is understood as mean for 
something else, when we really want to focus on the ethical and 
existential dimensions of a profession or organization Eikeland 
asserts that we must then concentrate primarily on action research 
as praxis research. This is also the case in the Socratic action 
research. As a result of this in a Socratic action research project we 
will not be searching for problems and pragmatic problem-
solutions but rather after wonders, fascination, or life impressions 
that really have made an impression on us. The philosophy is that 
when being in a praxis we are on a more existential, ethical and 
ontological level in resonance with life and what is meaningful and 
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worthy as such in being in and doing this praxis. So, the question 
the Socratic action researcher raises with his co-inquirers from the 
profession or organization is: How can we better connect with 
those enigmatic sources or life phenomena in daily life and 
professional and organizational work and living from where a 
deeper experience of meaning, beauty, and goodness is 
experienced? So, in order to awaken a growing sense for the 
“…regions where meanings and understanding originate, well up, 
and percolate, infect, touch, stir us, and exercise a formative and 
affective effect on our being…”64 the Socratic action research that 
Hansen
65
 has facilitated was typically built up around a Wonder 
Lab. This lab was a serial workshop of different exercises in 
phenomenological, hermeneutic, Socratic-dialectical, existential-
contemplative and phronetic reflections and dialogue forms.
66
 By 
going together as travel companions through these different forms 
of wonder-based reflections and actions the participants and the 
action researcher got – over due time – into a deeper dialogue with 
the praxis and the life phenomenon in this praxis which seems to 
call their attention. In the Wonder Lab they did not start up with a 
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clear and chosen question or clarification of a definition as in a 
Socratic one-on-one interview. They typically started out with a 
story and lived experience of ‘something’ (they did not know what 
is was from the beginning), that seems to have made a great 
impression on them when working or being in their daily work life 
at the organization.   
 The researcher first facilitates the wonder lab, but then the 
practitioners themselves will make their own kind of wonder labs 
(and experiments of wonder-based reflections) within their own 
profession with colleagues that are not in the pilot group of the 
action research project. This is to see how they will change and find 
new and better ways to create wonder-based reflections and 
dialogues in their own context. And when that happens - about half 
in the 2 or 3 year project – then and only then the action researcher 
might follow the co-inquirers more as a Socratic qualitative 
researcher - interviewing and observing them in the Socratic way 
that Dinkins does in her research. 
4) To encourage the practitioners to live a philosophical life in 
their own praxis: At last note on the feature of the Socratic action 
research is the ambition to train the practitioners to become 
Socratic researchers in their own praxis. Through the exercises and 
training in Socratic dialogue groups
67
 and Wonder Labs they will 
acquire a growing phenomenological sensitivity as well as a 
Socratic musicality for hearing and seeing the wonders and 
mysteries in their daily work life and life as such. This will help 
them also after the Socratic action researcher has ‘left the ship’ to 
take over and start taking ‘phenomenological snapshots’ from their 
life-worlds as practitioners in their field as well as creating Socratic 
communities of wonder on their own. This was indeed what happed 
for the staff of the Danish hospice when the action research project 
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was over. Today they have a continuous wonder lab each second 
week on equal basis as the psychological supervision group which 
also is held with the staff every second week.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the techniques and principles discussed in this article are a 
helpful base for Socratic interviewing or Socratic action research 
through wonder labs, a researcher wishing to try them out should 
not let herself become too tied to the specifics of these techniques. 
Certainly, they are important, and Plato in his illustration of 
Socrates’ dialogues employed them for a reason. Also important, 
though, is the dialogue itself. A dialogue between researcher and 
participants must be authentic, a genuine interaction in which the 
researcher listens carefully and respectfully and responds and 
questions honestly and openly. 
 After years of conducting qualitative and action research using 
Socratic shared inquiry, both authors have found it fruitful and 
rewarding for researcher and participants alike. Participants in one-
on-one interviews tend to report them being “cathartic” or “fun.” 
Participants find the interviews to be revelatory, and they seem to 
enjoy reflecting on and questioning their own beliefs. In action 
research there seems to follow a kind of philosophical lifestyle and 
Bildung process among the practitioner in the aftermath of a 
Socratic action research. And when evaluating the whole process 
many of the practitioners comment on the new kind of slowness 
and careful awareness in their thinking, that makes them able to 
‘stand in the openness’ without rushing to find an answer or find a 
quick solution. At the Danish Hospice one of the older and very 
experienced palliative nurses said that one of the greatest things she 
learned for the action research project was the possibility as a 
professional to “become small together around the Big Questions”. 
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This experience had taught her how not to try to act (seemingly 
professionally) as if one knows things – when in fact we in the 
encounter with the big question of life and death are all equals as 
fellow human beings, whether a patient, a relative, a nurse, or a 
philosopher.  
 The hope of the authors is that researchers who find their goals 
aligned with those outlined here will try out the Socratic approach 
in their research. Because of its flexibility and responsiveness, it 
can lead to wonderful connections between researcher and 
participant, and thus is rewarding not just in the research produced 
but in the journey to get there. 
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